Hazards Board Recommends Merritt Island

While Dr. Debus took the occasion of the top-level meeting at Huntsville on 25 April 1961 to brief Robert Seamans, NASA Associate Administrator, on the mobile launch concept, the conferees discussed other questions, especially the lack of space at Cape Canaveral. Gen. Donald Ostrander, Dr Wernher von Braun, and William Fleming, soon to be head of the Project Review Division, participated in the discussion. At its conclusion, Debus was directed to meet with Maj. Gen. Leighton I. Davis, commander of the Air Force Missile Test Center, to discuss NASA’s need for additional land.¹ The presidential challenge (a man on the moon by 1970) lent urgency to Debus’s inquiry. Very likely, the launching of a moon rocket, Saturn or Nova, would create blast hazards requiring a large safety zone around the pad. Acquisition of many acres of real estate was the next step in building the moonport and the question facing the Launch Operations Directorate (LOD) was, Where? The answer would prove twofold: NASA would build the moonport on land (Merritt Island) within the Air Force sphere of influence at Cape Canaveral, but in the process would work out an understanding with the Air Force that would secure freedom of action in NASA’s launch area.

Before recommending any land purchase, NASA and the Air Force had to determine the dangers involved in testing and launching a moon vehicle. In the last week of May 1961, the two groups set up a Joint Air Force-NASA Hazards Analysis Board to study the effects of blast, noise, fire, fragmentation, radiation, and toxicity. It would also prepare preliminary design data as a basis for safety perimeters for personnel and facilities within government-controlled areas, as well as for people and property in areas adjacent to the launch site.² Since NASA had reached no decision on the vehicle for the moon landing, the analysts considered the use of a Saturn C-3 booster of 13 million newtons (3 million pounds of thrust) and Nova boosters of 53, 98, and 164 million newtons (12, 22, and 37 million pounds of thrust). These were further classified as to fuels: liquid propellants, solid propellant for the booster and liquid propellants for the upper stages, and liquid propellant for the booster with a nuclear-powered upper stage.

On 1 June 1961, the board published a preliminary report of its findings and recommendations. The hazards analysis indicated that the minimum distance required for overall safety between the launch pad and uncontrolled areas varied from 5,270 meters for the Saturn C-3 to 15,240 meters for the 164-million-newton (37-million-pound-thrust) Nova booster. The minimum safe distance for nuclear stages reached 16 kilometers. The board concluded that if the government acquired additional land on Merritt Island, vehicles without nuclear upper stages could be launched from onshore facilities along False Cape north of Cape Canaveral. Further, since persons working within government-controlled areas could be given adequate protection, Merritt Island provided suitable land for industrial and technical support areas.³

A New Home in Georgia?

When the news spread that NASA was investigating launch sites, a group of Georgia businessmen suggested the coastal islands of their state. A survey team of NASA, Air Force, and Pan American personnel found many advantages at Cumberland Island: undeveloped land, railroad facilities, a coastal waterway, and port facilities. The team concluded that Cumberland Island merited further investigation as a site for launching large rockets.⁴

Beginning near the Florida state line, Cumberland Island extends north for 32 kilometers. It varies in width, being some 5 kilometers at the widest point. Extensive tidal flats, saltwater marshes, and the Intracoastal Waterway separate it from the Georgia mainland. Deepwater docks along the Intracoastal Waterway provided access to cheap water transportation. King’s Bay Ammunition Facility was close at hand, owned by the government, with readily accessible railroad sidings. Anticipated real estate costs were relatively low; to the north, however, were expensive island resorts.

In the meantime, the Air Force went ahead with proposals to purchase 93 square kilometers adjacent to Cape Canaveral at an estimated cost of $10 million. ⁵ One month after the Mercury flight of Alan Shepard, General Ostrander and Samuel Snyder from NASA Headquarters, Eberhard Rees from Huntsville, and Debus met with a group at Cape Canaveral on 5 June 1961. The conferees agreed that the NASA program would require more than the 93 square kilometers. A few days later, General Ostrander suggested that the group give greater consideration to Cumberland Island.⁶ An ad hoc committee under the chairmanship of William A. Fleming began work on 8 May. Its report, turned in on 16 June, spoke favorably of the southeast Georgia site. “There are alternate possibilities, besides AMR . . . One of the most promising . . . is the King’s Bay area along the Georgia coast . . .”⁷

The advantages of the Canaveral area were nevertheless overwhelming. It lay at the head of the Atlantic Missile Range, a series of tracking stations that reached southeastward almost 9,000 kilometers to Ascension Island (with further extensions under way for the Mercury program). Its trained personnel had launched many missiles. No big cities stood in danger from accidental explosions or wandering missiles. The noise would not disturb a large civilian population. Finally, while the Cape itself was filled up, there was room for expansion on Merritt Island and along the coastline north of False Cape.

The Canaveral area and Cumberland Island shared one advantage over other possible sites. Barges from Huntsville could sail down the Tennessee, Ohio, and Mississippi Rivers, through the Gulf, and up the east coast of Florida. In view of the mammoth proportions of the Saturn and Nova boosters under consideration as moon vehicles, this access to barge transport was an important consideration.

Organizing for the Debus-Davis Study

High-level agencies in Washington took a hand in the matter. On 16 June 1961 Roswell L. Gilpatric, Deputy Secretary of Defense, alerted the Secretaries of the Army, Navy, and Air Force to the joint planning by NASA and the Department of Defense concerning all elements of the space program, “including the extension of ground facilities.”⁸ He directed them to instruct commanders of national ranges and other officers in charge of space resources to lend their full support. At the Cape this responsibility fell to Gen. Leighton Davis. Montana-born, Davis had excelled at West Point as a student and instructor. After the entry of the United States into World War II, he had expressed dismay at the quality of the sighting equipment on the planes in his bomber command. The Army transferred him to research and development of gun and bomb sights at Wright Field in Ohio. Other R&D assignments followed, prior to his taking command of the Air Force Missile Test Center in May 1960.⁹

On 23 June, Robert Seamans formally requested Debus and Davis to study all major factors concerning launch requirements and procedures for Direct or orbital flights to the moon (chapter 4-8). NASA was to set up criteria for mission facilities, and AFMTC was to arrange for support facilities; both were to suggest guidelines for management structure and division of authority. On the 30th Seamans asked the two men to study all possible sites - mainland, offshore, and island locations. Their responsibility extended to the facilities and the acquisition of land, but not to worldwide tracking and command stations.¹⁰

On 6 July, Petrone for the Director of the Launch Operations Directorate, Col. Leonard Shapiro for the Air Force, and Col. Asa Gibbs, NASA Test Support Office Chief, drew up a detailed outline for the Debus-Davis study of the facilities and resources required at the launch site to support NASA’s manned lunar landing program.^* Petrone was responsible for operational plans and concepts and mission functions, launch facilities, operations control, and support requirements. Shapiro would develop plans for range support to be provided by the Department of Defense, including support facilities, utilities, and instrumentation in the launch area and downrange. Gibbs was responsible for analyzing and recommending appropriate management relationships at the range, including flight control and ground safety.¹¹ Since Shapiro had limited experience in this field of work, Col. Verne Creighton took his place for a time. Later, Shapiro returned to finish the report.¹²

While the opening section of the Debus-Davis Report explicitly set out a “NASA Manned Lunar Landing Program,” the section on funding revealed a different point of view on the part of the Air Force representatives. NASA’s proposal called for NASA to provide funds for construction of range support facilities, all mission facilities, and all instrumentation required for the Manned Lunar Landing Program. The Department of Defense would budget and fund for operation and maintenance costs of the range in support of this program, and NASA agreed to assist the Department of Defense in justifying these costs.¹³

The Air Force, on the other hand, saw the program as “national,” combining civilian and military control, rather than as a strictly civilian (NASA) enterprise. In the same Debus-Davis Report, the Air Force recommended that NASA and the Department of Defense budget their needs separately. NASA would budget and fund mission requirements. The Department of Defense would budget and fund range support requirements. The Defense proposal then spelled out its viewpoint: “Budgetary requirements for the Manned Lunar Landing Program will be submitted and justified as a ‘Joint Package,’ segregated by agency and department,” and “funds apportioned to the respective organizations will be administered according to policies and procedures internal to the agency or department.”¹⁴ Several years would elapse before the two organizations would clarify this delicate matter.

Recommending a Launch Site

During the month of July, the NASA-Air Force team considered eight sites:

• Cape Canaveral
• Offshore from Cape Canaveral
• Mayaguana Island in the Bahamas
• Cumberland Island, Georgia
• A mainland site near Brownsville, Texas
• White Sands Missile Range in New Mexico
• Christmas Island in the mid-Pacific south of Hawaii
• South Point on the island of Hawaii

Of the eight, the Debus-Davis Report estimated that White Sands would cost the least to develop and operate. These advantages were offset by its landlocked location; the lack of water transport would virtually dictate construction of the space vehicle assembly plant and test-firing stands near White Sands. Cost alone eliminated the island sites of Mayaguana, Christmas, and Hawaii, where construction and operation costs would be more than twice the estimates for White Sands or Cape Canaveral. The islands also posed severe problems of logistics. Although Brownsville costs were reasonable, launches from the Texas coast entailed a serious over-flight hazard for populated areas in the southeastern United States. Construction costs for an offshore complex at Cape Canaveral ran about 10% more than the costs of land purchase and development on shore, and maintenance estimates for the off shore sites were much higher.¹⁵

Cumberland Island enjoyed some of Cape Canaveral’s advantages: accessibility to deep water transport and railroads and no problem with overflight or booster impact. However, the Air Force listed a number of problems at Cumberland:

• Interference with the Intracoastal Waterway.
• Expensive launch area instrumentation would have to be duplicated.
• Land-based instrumentation for the early portion of flight would not be available.
• Extensive communications tie-ins with Cape Canaveral and downrange stations would be necessary.
• Towns in the area were small. The local economy might not support the large influx of people.
• The land area involved was primarily marshland.¹⁶

The Air Force listed only two disadvantages for Cape Canaveral: comparatively expensive land acquisition and higher-than-average cost for electrical power and water. Among the advantages for the Cape, the Air Force noted that “The Titusville-Cocoa-Melbourne area of Florida is a dynamic area which has been continuously growing with Cape Canaveral since the Cape’s inception. Therefore, we expect a minimum of problems in the further area expansion which will be necessary for this program.” Since “practically the entire local area population is missile oriented,” the Air Force foresaw a “minimum of public relations type problems due to missile hazards and inconveniences.”¹⁷

The NASA portion of the report cited two disadvantages at the Cape: labor conditions and the possibility of hurricanes. Local lore assured Canaveral newcomers that the eye of a hurricane had never passed over the area. Hurricanes had indeed passed near Merritt Island in 1885, 1893, 1926, and 1960 - one year before.¹⁸ As for its labor problem, Florida had never been an industrial state. Skilled workers in most categories were scarce, nonexistent in others. This meant that NASA and its contractors would not only have to call in engineers, scientists, and other experts from all parts of the country, but would have to attract craftsmen or train local men on the job for a wide variety of skills. Along with the men, manufactured goods would have to pour in from elsewhere, “such as copper wire, power and instrumentation cable, transformers, oil circuit breakers, generators” - to list but a few.¹⁹

Some shortcomings of the Cape went unmentioned in the report. Debus subsequently stated: “The chief drawback with this particular site was the danger of being swallowed up by the existing organization.”²⁰ This concern perhaps underlay the interest in Cumberland Island. There were also doubts as to the area’s ability to support the Apollo program. Remoteness a positive factor in the matter of safety - had its disadvantages in the lack of housing, stores, schools, and recreational facilities for new residents. The fastest growing county in the nation, Brevard had scarcely been able to keep up with the needs of pre-NASA expansion. Debus was keenly aware of the impact of a NASA-engendered boom on the people of Brevard County, an interest that later took such forms as a Community Impact Committee set up by Debus, Davis, and Governor Farris Bryant of Florida.²¹

The Questions Begin

Even before submission of the report, Debus had misgivings about NASA’s grip on the purse strings in the event the moonport was located within the Air Force sphere of influence at Cape Canaveral. Someone in the Department of Defense, it appeared, had already initiated plans to take over funds for LOD instrumentation and facilities. During a conference with Eberhard Rees, Associate Director of the Marshall Space Flight Center, Debus emphasized that the Launch Operations Directorate should control these funds at the Atlantic Missile Range and gave several instances of past problems to substantiate his position. Since Rees would be in Washington when Petrone was to deliver the report, it was agreed that Petrone would furnish Rees with arguments supporting NASA’s retention of funding control.²²

On 31 July 1961, scarcely a month after starting its work, the committee presented the Debus-Davis Report to Seamans in Washington. Two days later NASA Headquarters announced a worldwide study of launching sites for lunar spacecraft. Reflecting the concern of many inside and outside NASA, a Washington Post article stated that the size, power, noise, and possible hazards of Saturn or Nova rockets would require greater isolation for public safety than current NASA launch sites offered.²³

At this juncture, Milton W. Rosen, Acting Director of Launch Vehicle Programs, submitted a report to Webb and Dryden that called for a more complete study of Cumberland Island before a final decision in favor of the Canaveral area. Rosen wrote:

At Cumberland, however, there is an opportunity, one which we should not lose, to operate in a much simpler and more effective and less time-consuming manner. At Cumberland there could be at the beginning, at least, essentially one project directed toward a single major objective. The newness of Cumberland would be an asset. Both White Sands and Canaveral had simpler and more direct and less time-consuming procedures in their early days, when they did not have to cope with their present volumes of traffic.

Rosen noted that personnel living in the northern suburbs of Jacksonville could drive to work at Cumberland through less traffic than employees faced at Cape Canaveral. The cost of duplicating instrumentation was minor in contrast to the total investment at either site.²⁴

On the same day, however, the highly respected scientist-administrator Dr. Hugh Dryden sent in his conclusion: “In my judgement, the nation’s interests would best be served by expanding the existing range rather than developing an entirely new and separate installation at this time.”²⁵ NASA Headquarters announced plans six days later (24 August) to acquire approximately 324 square kilometers north and west of the Cape Canaveral launch area, largely on Merritt Island, for manned lunar flights.²⁶ While most observers felt that the deciding factor was financial, Gibbs believed that “the Hazard Report [of June 1961, pp. 87-88] was the whole basis on which the selection was really made.”²⁷ Petrone thought the decision had a wider base: the low cost, the proximity to available range resources, and compatibility with program requirements. In response to a direct question on the weight given in the Debus-Davis study to Merritt Island’s proximity to the tracking system, Petrone placed it “very high.” He also noted that when the decision was made, complex 34 was ready for operation and complex 37 was under construction on Cape Canaveral. With NASA making preliminary Saturn launches from these pads, locating the moonport hundreds of miles from the Cape would have created severe dislocations.²⁸ Whatever the decisive factors, NASA was committed to launching its manned lunar flights from the Florida facility. Working out of the same geographical area, NASA and the Air Force would have to face the magnitude of the man-in-space program, and the Air Force would have to recognize that NASA was not simply another range-user, waiting in line for its turn. New policies and procedures were called for.

The Webb-Gilpatric Agreement

On the same day that NASA announced its intention of obtaining land on Merritt Island, it signed an agreement with the Department of Defense that set guidelines for managing and funding the Manned Lunar Landing Program. This agreement, which took its name from James E. Webb, whom President Kennedy had just appointed to head NASA, and Deputy Secretary of Defense Roswell Gilpatric, set down three preliminary considerations: the Department of Defense and NASA recognized the great impact of the Manned Lunar Landing Program on the Atlantic Missile Range; in the national interest, the two should pool their resources to make the most effective use of the facilities and services; and the traditional relationship between range-user and range-operator would continue.²⁹

The agreement contained 11 provisions that gave NASA ultimate responsibility for acquiring the new land, improving it, constructing necessary buildings, and operating the Manned Lunar Landing Program facilities on the new site and elsewhere. The seventh provision read:

(7) As agent for NASA, the Department of the Air Force will: a) prepare and maintain a master plan of all facilities on the new site, to include the selection of sites for mission and range support facilities (NASA will be represented on the Master Planning Board); b) prepare design criteria for all land improvements and range support facilities subject to NASA approval, and arrange for the construction thereof; c) design, develop, and procure all communications, range instrumentation, and range support equipment required in support of NASA at or near the launch area.³⁰

Unfortunately, this hastily drafted document neither defined some critical terms nor included interpretative guidelines. The two parties resolved some simple disputes easily; others they found harder to overcome.³¹

Disagreement centered on the definition of the word agent in paragraph (7). According to NASA, an agent was one who acts for or in the place of another by authority from the principal. In the NASA view, the intent of the Webb-Gilpatric Agreement was not to give authority to the Air Force for master planning on Merritt Island; rather, the Air Force was to exercise the master planning functions by authority of NASA and subject to its approval. The Air Force, in contrast, stated that since range users never had the right to locate their launch facilities at the Atlantic Missile Range, it was the range commander’s responsibility to site all facilities in accordance with needs of all users. The Air Force, however, had no intention of assuming responsibility for design planning of any NASA mission facilities, such as launch pads.³²

The Air Force quite simply viewed the new area as an extension of the Cape Canaveral Missile Test Annex. To avoid unnecessary duplication of facilities and personnel, it seemed best that a single manager should control the operation. Responsible for development of the Eastern Test Range since October 1949, the Air Force had supported other agencies, including NASA, with manifold facilities in the areas of range safety, logistics, and tracking. From November 1958 to August 1961, first as the Atlantic Missile Range Operations Office, then after 1 July 1960 as the Launch Operations Directorate, NASA had funded the construction of blockhouses, launch pads, and assembly buildings for its specific programs on the Cape. The Air Force Missile Test Center had purchased and improved land and incorporated the new facilities into its real property accountability system. “Only certain specified services and functions,” the History of the Air Force Missile Test Center pointed out, “were provided NASA on a reimbursable basis.”³³

Now there was to be an important departure from the Air Force policy of retaining control of all real property at Canaveral. The Department of Defense could not provide money for an immediate purchase of Merritt Island. NASA would have to buy the land. During deliberations in the Office of the Secretary of Defense, preliminary to the Webb-Gilpatric Agreement, the Department of Defense Research and Engineering representatives had inserted a clause in the draft agreement to the effect that all land acquired in behalf of NASA should be transferred to the Department of Defense and incorporated into the Atlantic Missile Range. Gilpatric had questioned the need for such a clause and transfer, saying that the land belonged to the government. Gilpatric’s attitude would prove an unfavorable harbinger to Air Force enthusiasts who viewed Merritt Island as an extension of their Cape.³⁴ NASA eventually took the position that the Air Force, as the agent for NASA in relation to the new land, had assumed a completely new management position, and that NASA had the authority to control the management actions of its agent in these new and separate areas.³⁵

For the time, a reading of the Webb-Gilpatric Agreement, especially the controversial seventh provision, along with an understanding of the traditional Air Force viewpoint, might lead one to wonder how the Director of the Launch Operations Directorate had presumed he would have sufficient freedom of movement. Sometime later Debus recalled his reasons for agreeing to these arrangements. He stated,

Although it may appear that this agreement was to the advantage of the Air Force, you must remember that the Air Force did everything - everyone else was a customer. All their efforts were space oriented and anyone encroaching on this area was considered a challenge by the Air Force. During this period we had to continually make an effort to understand the Air Force’s position.³⁶

At the time, Debus discussed the tenancy aspects of the Webb-Gilpatric Agreement with Samuel Snyder, Associate Director of Launch Operations at NASA Headquarters, and General Ostrander. While he had suggestions for improving several points, Snyder had urged that “if we could live with it,” NASA should sign.³⁷ Debus and the Commander of the Missile Test Center hoped that they could avoid referring most issues to Washington, preferring to settle them locally.

The Launch Operations Director came to feel during the ensuing months that he needed a stronger hand in site selection and approval of facilities and could not live with the Air Force assumption that Merritt Island was simply an extension of Cape Canaveral. Even a casual observer could see that the two groups would not always be working in harmony and that their areas of operation overlapped at certain points. A new arrangement would eventually have to succeed the Webb-Gilpatric Agreement of August 1961.

Merritt Island Purchase

On 1 September, NASA asked Congress to authorize the purchase of 324 square kilometers of land on Merritt Island, immediately north and west of the existing missile launching area at Cape Canaveral. In support of the proposal, Senator Robert Kerr of Oklahoma, Chairman of the Senate Committee on Aeronautical and Space Sciences, stressed several factors. Stringent time schedules for the lunar program made the area ideal. NASA could reduce costs by use of existing resources, facilities, and personnel. The tracking network stretched almost 14,500 kilometers into the Indian Ocean. If NASA tried to start from scratch in another area, this one aspect of the program would be prohibitive. NASA could plan efficiently for future expansion in the new complex. And lastly, Senator Kerr insisted that this facility would be used for many years to come. Congress was favorable.³⁸

On 21 September, Seamans requested the Army Corps of Engineers to undertake the land acquisition.³⁹ Congress adjourned before authorizing the purchase. Without such authorization, NASA could not ask for the appropriation; but the agency’s reprogramming authority made it possible to start purchasing land before the end of 1961. NASA transferred funds from its Research and Development account to its Construction of Facilities Account, and advanced the money to the Army Corps of Engineers, its agent in purchasing the land, and balanced the books the following year.⁴⁰

The use of the Corps of Engineers in this way followed an established pattern of cooperation between NASA and the Corps.⁴¹ Morris A. Spooner, Chief, Real Estate Division, Jacksonville District Engineers, supervised the buying of the land. After notifying the public of NASA’s plans and the exact boundary of the area involved, the Corps opened an office in Titusville, the county seat, before the end of September.^* When all owners had listed their holdings, 440 tracts were involved. Three-fourths of the owners were absentee; three-fifths lived outside of Florida. The Corps hired experienced land appraisers from firms in Lakeland, Miami, Jacksonville Beach, and Melbourne and issued a booklet to explain the procedures to property owners.⁴² First, the Corps would identify the owner, map the land, and describe it legally. Then the appraiser would evaluate each tract. Finally, the Corps would negotiate with the owner. If negotiations proved successful, the direct purchase representative closed the deal; sometimes negotiations broke down and the government had to begin condemnation proceedings.⁴³

According to the NASA plan, one group of owners had to vacate their property by the end of February 1962. Many complained to the Titusville Star-Advocate that the Corps had not gotten in touch with them and offered a fair price. An editorial on 17 February 1962 maintained that the Corps had not moved as fast as it should have. It insisted that the agents of the federal government should have placed an equitable price on each piece of property and mailed the offer to the owner with a self-addressed return envelope. If the homeowner agreed, he could have notified the Engineers. If he did not, the Engineers could proceed with the suit in court.

It is common knowledge [the editorial went on] the Corps of Engineers is making offers for property subject to negotiation. Is this proper? Should the federal government agents go into the horse-trading business?. . . To send in negotiators is nothing less than high-pressure tactics to get the most for the least.

It urged the owners not to allow the Engineers to high-pressure them. If any delay occurred, the editorial concluded, “the Corps of Engineers should carry this delaying responsibility.”⁴⁴ In spite of this and other complaints, most land acquisitions moved ahead without too much delay. Many individuals took the Corps and NASA into court, but in almost every instance the jury verdict was in the government’s favor or close to the figure the government had offered.⁴⁵

While not involving a great number of people, the exodus had its poignant elements - as do all such transfers. This was home for many people, and a lovely home. One family had come down from Savannah, Georgia, a few years before and purchased a small estate near Happy Lagoon, about three kilometers north of where the assembly building was to rise. Husband and wife had come to cherish their new location. The Corps of Engineers assured them that if they purchased similar land north of Haulover Canal, they need never worry about moving again. They took the advice, only to have NASA subsequently reassess its needs and decide to expand farther north. The couple moved to Orlando.⁴⁶ The government retained 60 homes for interim use by NASA, the Corps of Engineers, or the Air Force.⁴⁷ Some individuals moved their houses to the mainland or to the south end of Merritt Island.

The Titan III Problem

During the fall of 1961, the Air Force was faced with the problem of finding a launch area for its new Titan III. This 39-meter missile consisted of a liquid-fueled central rocket flanked by two solid boosters of great power. Launch sites on Cape Canaveral, including pad 18, pad 20, and the tip of the Cape, were deemed unusable on account of blast and toxicity factors. Events took a collision course when Missile Test Center administrators decided the new NASA land on Merritt Island could be considered as a possible Titan launch site. The Air Force would place the Titan complex just north of complex 37, spacing the pads for use of class IX^* explosives. On the premise that the Air Force had master planning powers over the entire launch area, including the land NASA was acquiring on Merritt Island, the recommendation to site Titan III north of complex 37 and partly on NASA land (and submerged land) was accepted by Air Force Headquarters and approved by the Department of Defense. Further, a Titan overflight of LC-37 appeared to be no problem, and the corrosive effects of the Titan rocket exhaust would be negligible. The Missile Test Center proposed that NASA move its launch pads north to accommodate Titan III.⁴⁸

To this, Debus could not agree. LOD believed the corrosive effects of the Titan exhaust would pose a serious hazard to NASA space vehicles on launch complexes 34 and 37, and that any overflight would create serious safety restrictions. Placing the Titan III integration building on Merritt Island would interfere with NASA’s canal and bridge plans. The proposed Titan III firing rate would close down launch complex 37 or pad A of launch complex 39 once every ten days. Moving LC-39 farther north would double the distance from assembly building to launch area, increase the cost of communications lines by $1 million, and force NASA personnel to detour around the Titan III area in going from the Cape to LC-39. In sum, LOD believed a Titan III failure could seriously endanger NASA’s flight hardware, pads, and personnel; that Titan launch operations would interfere with NASA activities; and that a heavy concentration of escaping propellants from Titan III might cause serious corrosion problems in NASA spacecraft. Finally, LOD did not intend to launch spacecraft over Air Force sites and did not want Air Force missiles flying over its pads. The Launch Operations Directorate concluded that Titan III should be located north of the NASA area and recommended the purchase of an additional 60 square kilometers of land above the Haulover Canal for that purpose.⁴⁹

The Air Force was agreeable to buying this land and earmarking it for NASA, but this was no balm to LOD. The Titan affair seemed to say, if not in so many words, that the Air Force was standing on its rights as master of the entire launch area and deemed Merritt Island an extension of the Cape. Debus and his staff were troubled about the implications of the situation and tried - for many weeks without success - to convey their concern to the NASA administration.

In an effort to work out some of the problems, General Shriever, General Davis, and their staffs met on 19 February 1962 with a NASA team of D. Brainerd Holmes, Debus, and others. The conference produced a lamentable communications gap. Shriever understood that Holmes and Debus were agreeable to siting Titan III in the south where the Air Force wanted it, deferring selection of a moonport site, and purchasing additional land north of Haulover Canal. The actual NASA position, as set out at a Management Council meeting under Holmes’s chairmanship on 27 February, was that “the preferable solution to Cape siting problems is immediate acquisition of additional land to the north and siting the Titan III at the north, Nova in the center, and [Saturn] C-5 to the south.”⁵⁰ Much of the following month was devoted to the solution of this impasse, a process complicated by misunderstandings within the NASA command. Much to Debus’s disappointment, NASA agreed tentatively to the southern sitings.⁵¹ On 27 March a statement of the acceptability of overflight was signed by L. L. Kavanaugh, for the Department of Defense, and Robert Seamans. A still unreconciled Debus told the Management Council that NASA should retain control over NASA-purchased lands and seek an amendment to the Webb-Gilpatric Agreement providing for joint master planning.⁵²

Congress Says NASA

The LOD director was to have his turn sooner than he knew, but for the time being NASA Headquarters appeared loath to cross swords with the Air Force. Nor was the Air Force ready to relinquish any of its perquisites. On 29 March, John H. Rubel, Assistant Secretary of Defense, presented a statement to the Subcommittee on Manned Space Flight of the House Committee on Science and Astronautics. Rubel reviewed the procedures at the Atlantic Missile Range during 11 years. He gave no indication that the Air Force saw any noticeable difference between the manned lunar landing program and the other programs that had used the Cape during that time. The range commander had to have authority to make decisions in the common interest of all range users. At the same hearing, Seamans pointed out that some of the launch pads for Titan III would be on lands funded by NASA, just as some of the Saturn C-1 facilities were located on land originally funded by DoD. He stated: “It is not a question of our land or their land. It is the country’s land. It is a national range.”⁵³

The subcommittee chairman, Olin E. Teague (D., Tex.), told Rubel that the dispute confused him:

The main thing that troubles the committee is, we go to the Cape, for example, we talk with some of your responsible people there, we talk with some of Dr. Seamans’ responsible people and we come away confused, frustrated, disturbed, and they don’t agree on this overflight matter, and they don’t agree to a Titan siting next to a Saturn. . . . We have some questions we are going to submit to you, Mr. Rubel and Dr. Seamans, which we want answered for the record.

As a result the Teague committee sent 28 questions to the Department of Defense and NASA. Typical of the questions were:

• What is the management arrangement between DoD and NASA regarding NASA’s utilization of the national missile ranges?
• From a management and technology standpoint, does NASA lack the necessary capability to do their own siting and preliminary design for the new area?
• Would it be considered undesirable duplication to allow NASA to develop their own support unit for activities at AMR?⁵⁴

In a generally conciliatory set of answers, NASA recognized the contribution of the Air Force on the Cape, but strongly insisted that, “since NASA has MLLP [Manned Lunar Landing Program] responsibility to the Congress, it must exercise management and funding control of all its aspects.”⁵⁵ The Air Force felt that in answering Teague’s 28 questions, NASA had shifted its position and was interpreting the terms of the Webb-Gilpatric Agreement in a manner that would place the Air Force Missile Test Center in a subordinate role to NASA in every range matter concerned with the manned lunar landing program. The Air Force felt it could not give up its traditional role in the management and operation of the range, including the new area, “without a deterioration of its services to all agents collectively.”⁵⁶

Having stated its case, the Air Force did something about it. When the question of custody of the title to the land on Merritt Island arose, General Davis requested the District Chief of the Corps of Engineers to transfer the title of all property on Merritt Island to the Air Force.⁵⁷ Moreover, despite indications that land ownership was going to give NASA special status as more than an Air Force tenant, NASA Headquarters at Washington seemed ready to concede the point with the proposed new purchase. It would let the Air Force buy and hold title to the 60 square kilometers at the north end of the range which, it was agreed, should be acquired for NASA’s use in lieu of the land lost to Titan III.

In looking back at the issues, Rocco Petrone stated flatly in an interview some years later: “The ownership of the land . . . was a key one.” “In those days NASA was a pretty small customer,” Petrone admitted, “and tackling DoD was a tough game . . . Webb knew that at all costs he had to have peace in a federal family, the two agencies that could go into space, NASA and DoD.” Further Webb had to face one of the most prestigious men in the new administration, Secretary of Defense Robert S. McNamara; and Webb had to recognize that the Air Force had long considered space its province. Petrone felt that only the presidential decision had given NASA priority in the lunar program.⁵⁸

For the time being NASA Headquarters was cooperating with the Air Force to enable the latter to purchase the land earmarked for NASA in compensation for the Titan sites. Seamans wrote Webb on 13 April that “although the Debus-Holmes recommendation is that NASA seek to acquire the additional acreage, it is my feeling that since the Titan III program forms the basis for this need, it is more desirable for DoD to seek this additional land.”⁵⁹ Webb agreed and notified McNamara of NASA’s acquiescence in the Air Force siting of the Titan pads, and the Air Force purchase of compensatory acreage.⁶⁰ An article in Missiles and Rockets for 30 April 1962 reported that the Air Force wanted to put its Titan pads at the south end of the coastal area of the expansion tract (NASA’s Merritt Island purchase), and that this would force NASA to relocate its pads. “The NASA position is that this is fine as long as the Air Force provides the funds.”⁶¹ The Bureau of the Budget approved the Department of Defense request.⁶²

By this time it appeared to NASA people at Canaveral that Headquarters in Washington had given in and agreed that the lunar team was only one of many tenants using Air Force facilities at the discretion of the Air Force. But help came from another quarter. Robert Seamans and Dr. Brockway McMillan, the Assistant Secretary of the Air Force for Research and Development, appeared before the Military Construction Subcommittee of the Senate on 8 May to testify in favor of DoD’s acquiring the additional land. Their testimony backfired. Henry Jackson (D., Wash.), Chairman of the Subcommittee, saw the wisdom in the purchase of the new land. But the testimony showed that the additional acreage would support NASA development. Since NASA was a civilian agency, he would not honor the request and so wrote McNamara on 21 May.⁶³ In a reply three days later, McNamara explained the Air Force’s position, but conceded the Senator’s point that it could well be a NASA purchase “provided the use of this and all other land at the Cape is subject to the joint use policy under a single manager.”⁶⁴ McNamara concluded his letter with the assurance that NASA was in the process of presenting the request through the proper congressional committee. NASA then took over the task of pushing the matter with Congress.

On 14 June, Debus notified Davis of word received from Washington. NASA and the Department of Defense had agreed that NASA would buy the additional 60 square kilometers of land and was submitting the recommendation to Congress for the FY 1963 authorization bill. He understood that the concerned congressional committees had not opposed the purchase.⁶⁵ James Webb appeared before the Senate Subcommittee on Appropriations on 10 August and explained in full the need for additional land. Chairman Warren Magnuson (D., Wash.) and Senator Leverett Saltonstall (R., Mass.) did most of the questioning as Webb went beyond the simple request for more funds to a wide statement on the whole program.⁶⁶ NASA’s 1963 Authorization Act, passed four days later, included funds for the additional land north of Haulover Canal and included a key statement as to jurisdiction: “All real estate heretofore or hereafter acquired by the United States for the use of the National Aeronautics and Space Administration shall remain under the control and jurisdiction of that Administration, unless it is disposed of in accordance with the Federal Property and Administrative Services Act of 1949 (63 Stat. 377), as amended.”⁶⁷

At this point the bureaucratic infighting reached a draw. The Air Force had placed its Titan III facilities on part of NASA’s Merritt Island land, but NASA retained jurisdiction over the land, nailed down by its further acquisition of the last 60 square kilometers at the northern limits of the Florida launch area. NASA had established its status as more than a tenant of the Air Force. It would be a mistake to make too much of the disagreement. At the Cape, NASA and Air Force personnel were working together on a day-to-day basis, and the Launch Operations Center was always quick to acknowledge its debt to the Missile Test Center. There is some force to an Air Force suggestion that it was creating issues to get clear-cut decisions from Washington on the powers and responsibilities of the two agencies. The decision finally came down - NASA, and not NASA and the Air Force, would put a man on the moon. During the negotiations John Glenn and Scott Carpenter had orbited the earth, and the American public was cheering for its new space agency.

A New Agreement

It was time for a review of the Webb-Gilpatric Agreement. NASA and the Department of Defense had distinctive programs. The Department of Defense agencies that used the range were primarily research and development users of a test facility for the development of weapon systems. NASA, in addition to doing R&D, was an operational user of launch facilities for the exploration of space. Congress indicated its intent that the land on Merritt Island remain under the control of NASA by the way funds were appropriated for its purchase, but NASA did not propose to disturb in any significant way the arrangements at Cape Canaveral or the downrange facilities and intended to pay a prorated share of the operating expenses of the Atlantic Missile Range. Under these circumstances, Webb wrote to Gilpatric on 14 August 1962, with a draft that he hoped would replace their earlier agreement.⁶⁸ During the fall and early winter of 1962, NASA and the Department of Defense engaged in a series of conferences that led to a clarification of relationships at Cape Canaveral and Merritt Island. General Davis wrote to the Secretary of Defense, for instance, pointing out the duplication of support activities that might be required - such things as guard services, printing plants, fuel analysis laboratories, instrument repair shops, fire protection, and weather forecasting. He admitted that a division on a geographical basis was possible, but advised that NASA be prepared to accept the responsibility for the necessary duplication.⁶⁹ On 17 January 1963 NASA Administrator Webb and Secretary of Defense McNamara signed a new agreement.

NASA gained two points. Paragraph B of the General Concept stated: “In recognition of the acquisition by NASA of MILA (Merritt Island Launch Area) and its anticipated use predominantly in support of the Manned Lunar Landing Program and in order to provide more direct control by NASA of MILA development and operation, the Merritt Island Launch Area is considered a NASA installation separate and distinct from the Atlantic Missile Range.”⁷⁰ In the area of master planning, NASA also had more liberty. Further agreements and additions during the spring and summer of 1963 settled many of the minor problems that remained.⁷¹

Land, Lots of Land - Much of It Marshy

While NASA and the Air Force pursued their own battle for beachheads, the Corps of Engineers continued its less spectacular efforts to stake out NASA’s new land holdings on Merritt Island and at the north end of the range. Within two and a half years of its initial commission (that is, by 1 February 1964), the Corps had acquired the bulk of the needed land. Out of the more than 1,500 ownerships involved initially, a few were to remain unsettled for several years more.⁷² Not unexpectedly, the absentee owners of large tracts who could delay and negotiate came off better than the small owners who sometimes found their awards inadequate to purchase similar property in the neighborhood. At least one person owning cultivated land on Merritt Island sold the tract for $244 an acre. But one year later, when she wanted to purchase a similar plot on a non-NASA section of the island, she found the price to be $3,000 an acre.⁷³

The buildings did not prove as simple an acquisition as the land. The Corps sold some for salvage, transferred 44 to the Brevard County School System for use as temporary classrooms, and turned one old building into a museum. The Air Force, among others, used the Standard Oil station to service official vehicles, the Roberts residence as a first-aid station, and several homes as security patrol offices. The purchase included a considerable number of trailers that eventually served in a variety of capacities.⁷⁴

The disposition of more than 12 square kilometers of citrus trees proved one of the most difficult problems. NASA at first proposed to lease the land to the growers for five years. A representative of the Merritt Island citrus growers stated that they were willing to vacate their dwellings and farm the groves in accordance with NASA regulations, but desired to retain title to the property. They were afraid that a lease system would not guarantee them any right of repurchase if NASA no longer needed the tracts. The growers rightfully pointed out that it was difficult to spray, fertilize, and cultivate the groves without a guarantee that they could gather the fruit. Debus met with J. Hardin Peterson, a lawyer representing the Florida Citrus Mutual, as early as December 1961 and assured him and representatives of the citrus growers on North Merritt Island of NASA’s good will.⁷⁵

A group of citrus growers carried their complaints to Senator Spessard L. Holland (D., Fla.), Chairman of the Subcommittee on Appropriations, who asked some sharp-edged questions of NASA Associate Administrator Robert Seamans in the April 1962 hearings on the Second Supplemental Appropriation Bill. Seamans referred the queries to Ralph E. Ulmer, Director of Facilities Coordination. Ulmer tried to dismiss Senator Holland’s question with the statement: “We have received no recent complaints from landowners on that score.” Senator Holland answered flatly: “You have received them, because I passed them on myself directly to Mr. Webb and to others in NASA, going back to last fall.” The Senator insisted that the heart of the matter was NASA’s attitude toward the production of citrus on eight square kilometers of valuable groves. Ulmer promised to give the matter careful attention. Late the following year, the Corps of Engineers announced a lease plan for the Merritt Island citrus groves that seemed much more satisfactory than earlier arrangements. In place of the original five-year lease plan, the Corps offered the original grove owners a lease until 30 June 1968, with an option to renew the lease for an additional five years. Two factors tended to make this option essential for the growers: young trees required more than five years to develop and the high cost of equipment could not be recovered in five years.⁷⁶

The space agency finally took 340 square kilometers by purchase and negotiated with the State of Florida for the use of an additional 225 square kilometers of submerged lands. Much of the latter lay within the Mosquito Lagoon, separated from the ocean by a narrow strip of beach on the east. The property cost $72,171,487.⁷⁷ The Space Center invited Brevard County to maintain a public beach north of the launching facilities, to be used whenever activities on the pads did not create a hazard. In 1963 NASA empowered the National Wildlife Service to administer those areas of the Space Center not immediately involved in space launch operations. At the time this covered about 230 square kilometers and formed a safety belt between the launch area and the population centers to the west and northwest. A few years later the manager of the Merritt Island National Wildlife Refuge was to report the identification of more than 150 species of birds. During the winter season the waterfowl population exceeded 400,000. Animals included alligators, wild pigs, and bobcats.⁷⁸

NASA and the Department of the Interior were to finalize the arrangements between KSC and the Refuge some years later. NASA added lands, submerged lands, and waters, increasing the total under the control of the Refuge to 508 square kilometers. By this agreement, the Refuge would administer the citrus groves and lease fishing camps, previously handled by the Corps of Engineers; operate Playalinda Beach at the north end of the Cape; and cooperate with the Brevard Mosquito Control District. NASA provided fire protection and would continue to maintain all major highways, bridges, and traffic signals required for employee and public access to the spaceport and adjacent facilities. NASA could make use of these areas at any time in conjunction with the space program. NASA could terminate the agreement when the space program demanded it, or if the Bureau of Sport Fisheries and Wildlife failed to use the premises according to the terms of the agreement. The Bureau, on its part, could withdraw if the nature of the space activities rendered the area unsuitable for wildlife purposes.⁷⁹ NASA would have all the land it needed for the foreseeable future, as well as a safety belt that served a second purpose as a wildlife refuge.