Rapidly Evolving Hardware

In the year following the Debus-Davis study, Huntsville planners kept coming up with a larger Saturn, only to discard it for a still bigger one. Their bigger-rocket designs, coupled with lunar-orbital rendezvous, could drop the Apollo launch rate from 13 Saturns a year to 6, well below what Debus had warned was an economic use for the mobile concept. Critics in and out of NASA began to question the wisdom of the mobile concept, but it rolled on. For one thing, the plan was under way and time and money had been invested in its development. For another, Debus and Petrone were proving effective advocates, stressing the concept’s flexibility when declining launch rates undercut its major premise. Finally Congress and the country wanted NASA “to travel first class” if it meant beating Russia to the moon. The Launch Operations Directorate (LOD) men believed their proposals promised first class travel to the moon and beyond.

Although acceptance of the Debus-Davis Report was a more-or-less green light for the mobile concept, several major questions remained about moving a gigantic rocket over Merritt Island’s marshes from assembly building to launch pad. Cost remained a primary consideration. But during the last six months of 1961, LOD’s great concern lay in the plethora of rocket designs and rendezvous studies that kept pouring out of Huntsville and Washington. An orderly account of events belies the tentative manner in which the Debus team had to plan launch facilities for problematical rockets flying on undetermined flight paths to the moon.

The Lundin Committee had taken a “quick look” (one week) at the rendezvous mode of accomplishing the manned lunar landing [see chapter 4-7]. In late June 1961 Associate Administrator Seamans directed Air Force Col, Donald H. Heaton of NASA Headquarters to conduct a more detailed study. Heaton’s committee supported the Lundin finding that an earth-orbital rendezvous promised the earliest lunar landing and at less cost than a direct ascent. Its August report recommended the use of a Saturn C-4 with four F-1 engines. The C-4’s bigger payload would reduce the number of rendezvous vehicles, with “a higher probability of an earlier successful manned lunar landing than the C-3."¹

Despite the Heaton Committee’s recommendation, General Ostrander’s Office of Launch Vehicle Programs urged an early start for the Saturn C-3 program. Seamans was not ready to commit himself, having agreed in July to a NASA-DoD Launch vehicle study. Nicholas Golovin, a mathematician who had previously worked on the Mercury project, directed the joint study. Although the group failed to establish a national launch vehicle program, it outlined alternative programs (including developmental flights) for a manned lunar landing:

• Lunar-orbit rendezvous. 28 Saturn C-1 flights and 38 C-4 flights. First landing possible in October 1967. Cost of program, $7.33 billion.
• Earth-orbit rendezvous. 32 Saturn C-1 flights and 53 C-4 flights. First landing possible in July 1968. Cost of program, $8.16 billion.
• Direct ascent. 22 Saturn C-1 flights and 38 flights of a Nova configuration with eight F-1 engines in the first stage, eight J-2 engines in the second stage, and two J-2 engines in the third stage. First landing possible in October 1968. Cost of program, $6.39 billion.²

Contemporary with the changing studies in Washington, the Saturn launch vehicle evolved rapidly in Huntsville, going from a C-3 version in June to a C-5 in December. Plans for the C-3 were barely under way when Marshall Space Flight Center initiated studies of a larger C-4. The C-4, incorporating Four F-1 engines in the booster and five J-2 engines in the second stage, at first seemed large enough to power a lunar landing mission via either lunar-orbital or earth-orbital rendezvous. As spacecraft weight estimates continued upward, Marshall officials began to question this assumption. Von Braun’s proposal to add a fifth F-1 engine, making the C-4 a C-5, was approved in November when Milton Rosen, NASA Director of Launch Vehicles and Propulsion, made another launch vehicle study. Rosen’s team spent two weeks in Huntsville matching potential launch vehicles with lunar landing missions. The group’s findings reinforced von Braun’s argument for a C-5; the C-4’s capability for a rendezvous mission was marginal. Since the clustering of the four F-1 engines left a large open space in the C-4’s first stage, a fifth engine would strengthen the Saturn design. Rosen pointed out that a fifth engine could be mounted at the junction of two very strong crossbeams that supported the other four engines. This eliminated a potential trouble spot since the junction would have been exposed to excessive exhaust backwash and a serious overheating problem. Marshall engineers estimated that the C-5 would place 108,900 kilograms in earth orbit or lift 40,200 kilograms to escape velocity. Still short of a direct ascent capability (68,000 kilograms to escape velocity), the C-5 provided ample power for a rendezvous mission.³

Decisions came rapidly during the next four weeks. On 4 December 1961, Seamans agreed to the Rosen Committee’s recommendations. NASA selected the Boeing Company as a possible prime contractor for the first stage on the 15th. The frame (10-meter diameter, 42.7 meters in length) would be manufactured at NASA’s Michoud plant just east of New Orleans. At its first meeting on the 21st, the Manned Space Flight Management Council^* approved the C-5 configuration of five F-1 engines in the first S-IC stage, five J-2 engines in the second S-II stage, and one J-2 in the third S-IVB stage. The same day NASA Headquarters began negotiations with Douglas Aircraft Company to modify the C-1’s S-IV stage for use as the S-IVB. As NASA had indicated in September that North American Aviation would build the S-II stage, the Douglas selection rounded out the team of contractors for the Saturn C-5. Formal announcement that Marshall Space Flight Center would direct C-5 development came in January 1962.⁴

The Space Task Group, NASA’s spacecraft organization, went through an equally hectic six months after the lunar-landing decision. STG and McDonnell Aircraft Corporation had been considering advanced Mercury projects since September 1959; proposals included a maneuverable Mercury capsule, extended missions of 14 days, a two-man vehicle, and a rendezvous attempt. In May 1961, Martin Company spokesmen approached NASA officials about the use of the Titan II missile in a post-Mercury program. Further presentations convinced Robert Gilruth, Space Task Group chief, of the Titan II’s merits. Engineers prepared a project development plan calling for the two-man Mercury spacecraft and a modified Titan II booster. As a rendezvous capability seemed very important for Apollo, the project included an Agena rendezvous target, boosted into earth orbit by an Atlas launch vehicle. The project wan approval in December and was formally christened the Gemini program^** the following month.⁵

Work on the Apollo spacecraft also moved forward. NASA Headquarters announced on 9 September 1961 the establishment of a Manned Spacecraft Center at Houston. The center would design, develop, evaluate, and test Apollo spacecraft and train astronauts for space missions. Robert Gilruth would head the new organization with his Space Task Group as its nucleus.⁶

The home and organization were new, but not the mission. The Gilruth team had prepared the preliminary guidelines for an advanced manned spacecraft in March 1960. In subsequent months the group had enlisted research assistance from other NASA centers, briefed American industry, and awarded contracts for spacecraft feasibility studies. By mid-1961 Gilruth was ready to invite bids on the prime Apollo spacecraft. The 28 July work statement described three phases of the Apollo program. Manned earth-orbital flights and unmanned reentry flights comprised phase one missions. NASA would qualify spacecraft systems and the heat shield, study human reactions to extended periods in space, conduct experiments related to the lunar mission, and work on flight and ground operational techniques. The second phase involved circumlunar flights to develop the Apollo spacecraft and conduct lunar reconnaissance. Manned lunar landings would come in phase three.⁷

The work statement called for the design and manufacture of a command module and associated ground support equipment. The contractor would also provide test spacecraft For Saturn C-1 developmental vehicles and mockups. A second major assignment involved the integration of the spacecraft modules with each other, with the launch vehicle, and with ground support equipment. During operations the contractor would prepare the spacecraft for flight and monitor its systems. Description of the command and service modules ran more than 20 pages. Major systems of the two modules included guidance and control, vernier propulsion for longitudinal velocity and thrust-vector control, mission propulsion, reaction control, provisions for escape during launch, environmental control, electrical power, communications and instrumentation, and a number of crew-related systems. Although NASA had not decided on the mission mode, the Space Task Group nevertheless included some general plans of a lunar landing module for direct ascent or an earth-orbital rendezvous mission. Twelve companies bid on the contract that would eventually cost NASA over 2.2 billion dollars. in November, NASA announced the selection of North American Aviation for the task.⁸ Mission, rocket, and spacecraft were taking form.

The Mobile Launch Plan Comes under Fire

While rocket and spacecraft plans were proceeding, the Martin Marietta Corporation of Baltimore began work on a two-part launch facility study. In part one Martin was to recommend an “optimum concept for facilities to launch Saturn C-3 vehicles at specified rates”; part two involved design of a launch complex based upon the selected concept.⁹ The Martin team reported its part one findings orally at Huntsville on 27 September 1961. As in its earlier C-2 study, the Martin Company found the fixed concept superior for a launch rate below 12 Saturns a year and the mobile concept clearly preferable at annual launch rates above 24. The team recommended moving the rocket by canal. The 3,350-meter safety distance between assembly building and pad (almost twice that for the C-2) and the C-3’s greater weight had multiplied rail costs. Martin placed the cost of one barge launcher-transporter and pad at $8.152 million, while estimating the cost of comparable rail facilities at $21.965 million. Other advantages of the canal system included more room for bigger cargoes (growth potential for the Nova), a turning basin that compared favorably with complicated switching arrangements by rail, and best use of the Cape’s marshy terrain. Although acknowledging a lack of data, the team discounted the wind effect on a barge transporter.¹⁰

At the end of the presentation, von Braun asked the Martin team to interrupt their C-3 study and conduct a quick investigation of launch requirements for a Saturn C-4. Martin’s mid-October report contained no major changes. A Launch Facilities and Support Equipment Office (LFSEO) study, completed in late October, reached similar conclusions. Assuming an annual launch rate of 30 Saturn C-4s, LFSEO placed the cost of fixed facilities at $350.5 million, of rail $278.2 million, and of barge $259.1 million. The barge savings came entirely from the canal’s lower cost. The study noted that “movement of a transporter launcher with vehicle by barge will present some difficult engineering problems [but] preliminary investigation has shown that it is feasible and within current ’state of the art’ capability.”¹¹

As LOD moved ahead with LC-39 planning, some of its members began to have second thoughts. Georg von Tiesenhausen noted in October that “after an initial period of general acceptance, various segments of LOD are now reluctant to go ahead to develop this [mobile] concept.” The size of the C-4, the boldness of the concept, and uncertainty about future launch rates contributed to the uneasiness. Von Tiesenhausen did not agree with the critics: “There is no insurmountable problem involved, engineering-wise or operationally, which appears, that cannot readily be solved... This concept is highly flexible, readily expandable, and most economical for launch rates to be expected in the future.”¹²

Connell & Associates, engineering consultants on LC-34 and LC-37, did not share this optimism and volunteered criticism in November. Harvey Pierce’s eight-page letter to Debus acknowledged certain advantages or the mobile concept: more efficient use of land and personnel; only one launch control center; assembly and erection inside a building; and a brief checkout period (one week on the firing pad). The disadvantages, however, were more significant:

• Pad stay time is estimated at one week. During this entire period the vehicle is unprotected and subject to the elements. Since the weather cannot be predicted accurately for such a period, the vehicle must be designed for stability in line squall winds up to 70 knots... This may comprise a severe penalty in vehicle design.
• Transporting the erected vehicle over a considerable distance must subject it to vibration which has not previously been encountered.
• A bending moment due to tilting the very tall vehicle away from true vertical will result from a wheeled transporter traveling up a slope or from a water-borne transporter under high wind loading... The bending load must be considered additive to the wind load, and will add structural weight to the flight vehicle.
• Tests with cryogenic fluids must be made at the launch pad. If leaks are detected, repairs probably cannot be made without withdrawal to the remote area... There is no reason to assume a lower incidence of these leaks in the future than in the past.
• This concept places the maximum emphasis on correct first guesses, and the maximum penalty on a wrong guess. The remote assembly-checkout facility, the transporter device, and the route development for the transporter must have the ability to handle all future vehicles, and will soon limit the vehicle design to fit their capabilities. This is an extreme limitation to accept this early in any program.
• In addition to some immediate decisions on some very difficult criteria predictions, the chances of having a usable facility in the near future are minimized by the difficult problems which are anticipated but unsolved... Considering all factors it appears that the vehicle could easily be ready and available many months, perhaps years, in advance of available launch facilities.

The letter called for a thorough examination, with model studies and wind tunnel tests, of design and construction requirements for the remote assembly building, stability of the rocket in transit, shock and sound over-pressure effects on launcher-transporter equipment, placement of launcher transporter and flame deflector at pad, transporter propulsion, barge stability, and rail switching. Although the Connell engineers agreed that all technical problems could be resolved with sufficient time and money, they recommended the use of fixed launch facilities for LC-39.¹³

A Trip by Barge or a Trip by Rail?

The Connell letter pointed up the crucial role of the launcher-transporter in LC-39 planning. Its characteristics determined the design criteria of other facilities. The success of the mobile concept rested on the transfer system; the system’s development involved some of LOD’s most difficult engineering problems. Understandably, the selection of a transporter became a major event in the LC-39 story. The launcher-transporter fell within the purview of Theodore Poppel’s Launch Facilities and Support Equipment Office (LFSEO). A Poppel directive on the October C-4 study indicates that the item, while crucial to LC-39, was a small part of the office’s workload:

• Mr. [Chester] Wasileski will start on the propellant systems immediately.
• Mr. [Donald] Buchanan will start on the launch transporter and the fixed launch sites as soon as possible.
• Mr. [Robert] Moore’s office will supply certain paragraphs and photographs that are generally applicable in this study.
• Mr. [Julian] Hamilton’s outfit will come up with a light coverage of transportation with an illustration or two. Mr. [Georg] von Tiesenhausen will start with some overall layouts.
• Mr. [R. P.] Dodd will start on the assembly building immediately as to cost and arrangement. Mr. [Lester] Owens will determine blast distances. Mr. [O. K.] Duren will be in charge of the overall coordination and the written material . . . .¹⁴

Everyone in LFSEO was busy, but perhaps the heaviest workload fell to Donald Buchanan. After four years of Air Force duty in World War II, Buchanan had earned a degree in mechanical engineering at the University of Virginia. He had joined the National Advisory Committee for Aeronautics at Langley Field, Virginia, in 1949, moving on to Redstone Arsenal in 1956. Buchanan’s responsibilities as Launcher Systems and Umbilical Tower Design Section Chief included pad arrangement and deflector design. Although Poppel and Lester Owens, Deputy Chief of LFSEO, intentionally left the launcher-transporter selection open to the entire office, Buchanan took the lead in the barge investigations. In April 1962 he assumed responsibility for transporter development.¹⁵

Cost estimates on a canal system were favorable, but the use of a barge as the launcher-transporter raised a number of engineering questions: How to position the barge and flame deflector at the launch site? What means of propulsion and steering to use? How to ensure a stable platform for the launch vehicle? While Martin Marietta examined these matters in the second part of its C-3 study, LOD stepped up its own inquiry. On 2 November an LOD team inspected the elevating mechanism of a Gulf Coast offshore oil rig. A possible solution to the positioning problem at the launch site involved the use of Texas Tower legs on the barge-transporter. The long tubular legs, actuated by a hydraulic jacking system, would be located at each corner of the barge. While the barge was under way, the legs would be raised until flush with the bottom of the barge. At the launch position, the legs would be lowered to rest firmly on a concrete basin. Then the hydraulic system would raise the barge on the legs to provide sufficient clearance for the flame deflector to float beneath it. However, a Launch Facilities and Support Equipment report opposed the hydraulic jacking system since it would place the launch platform at least 18 meters above ground level. In its place, the report recommended a deeper concrete launch basin with the barge positioned on supports extending outward from the basin walls. A lift-gate (lock) would allow sufficient water to be drained to permit passage of the deflector beneath the launcher. This plan offered a low profile (the launch platform would be only 2.4 meters above ground level), but this advantage would be offset by the increased costs of the lift-gate and deeper basin.¹⁶

Lacking expertise in barge propulsion and stability, LOD hired a Baltimore naval architect, M. Mack Earle, “to review the static and dynamic stability programs . . . and prepare a model test program.” Earle’s preliminary report warned that LOD would likely encounter problems with the propulsion system in restricted canals. Early in the new year Earle began arranging for a test program at the David Taylor Model Basin in Washington, D. C.¹⁷

Martin Marietta Corporation submitted the second part of its C-3 launch facility study on 11 January 1962. The report recommended use of a barge 55 × 41 meters, with 1.8 meters draft. Thirteen kilometers of canal, 61 meters wide and 4.6 meters deep, would service the three-pad complex. Four to six Murray and Tregurtha Harbormaster motors would propel the barge. Rated at 530 horsepower, this large outboard motor was capable of achieving nearly 900 horsepower for limited periods. Estimating 45 pounds of thrust per horsepower, Martin calculated that six Harbormaster units would overcome the drag of a 60-knot wind. Fixed legs, designed by DeLong Corporation and R. G. LeTourneau, Inc. (specialists in offshore oil drilling platforms), would elevate the barge out of the water at the vertical assembly building, the arming tower, and the launch pad.¹⁸

After NASA chose to develop the Saturn C-5 for the moon mission, little time remained to select a transfer mode. On 23 January, American Machine & Foundry Company presented the results of a comprehensive survey that included railway wheels, pneumatic tires, crawler treads, barge, and special ground effects, and recommended a rail-barge combination possibly using mechanical mules.¹⁹ Debus agreed with their report; he informed Petrone a week later that he tentatively supported a plan “to let the barge weight be carried by water, but use for stabilization and propulsion a rail which carries only partial weight.” The LOD Director reviewed transfer modes with Zeiler, Poppel, and O. K. Duren on 30 January, discussion centering on the merits of another launch vehicle transfer study. Although the group postponed an award in hopes that additional suggestions might appear, Debus did not intend to wait long. Summarizing the meeting for Petrone, Debus wrote: “It appears urgent that we have a program for the crucial engineering studies and possibly cost estimates for these studies early next week because a decision to proceed on 39 is imminent."²⁰

In this atmosphere, a chance meeting at Huntsville introduced a new transporter to the LC-39 competition. Duren, an Auburn University graduate, had been with von Braun since 1951, most recently as Deputy Chief of the Future Launch Systems Study Office. On 2 February, Duren received a call from Barry Schlenk, a Bucyrus-Erie Company representative. While discussing Titan silo overhead cranes with Thiokol Corporation, Schlenk had overheard a remark about LOD’s transport problem. The two men spent the afternoon examining some pictures of Bucyrus-Erie’s steamshovel crawler used in the Kentucky coal fields. The vehicle seemed suited to LOD’s needs; its characteristics included a leveling capability to balance a load on uneven terrain. Caught up in Schlenk’s enthusiasm, Duren called Albert Zeiler about his find. Zeiler was skeptical, but agreed to look into the matter.²¹

Four days later, LOD laid plans for barge, rail, and crawler studies. The staff concurred in a three-month barge study at David Taylor Model Basin, employing a 1:10 scale model of the barge. Additional tests would be run in a wind tunnel with a 1:60 scale model. A consulting engineer, William G. Griffith, would assist the Launch Facilities and Support Equipment Office on another rail study, this one concentrating on dynamic loads and foundation costs. Poppel’s group (LFSEO) would follow up the Bucyrus-Erie lead with an inspection of the crawler shovel.²²

When Donald Buchanan and George Walter arrived in Washington on 20 February, David Taylor Model Basin officials brought some uncomfortable facts to light. LOD’s proposed canals were too narrow and would cause serious propulsion and steering problems. The steering problem resulted from the venturi effect. The relative motion of water to barge in the 3-meter space between the canal bank and the barge decreased the pressure on the side of the barge, causing a suction effect. The David Taylor officials recommended a wider canal - and that would raise costs considerably. Then wind-tunnel tests indicated that the drag effect in a 60-knot wind might be three times the estimated value. Basin tests also revealed that the arrangement of the six Harbormaster motors, three across the bow and three across the stern, reduced motor efficiency. There were several possible solutions: tugboats fore and aft of the barge, air jets placed below the waterline, and spuds (vertical steel pipes) to anchor the barge in heavy winds. These involved new tests and cost projections.²³

In his rail study William Griffith concentrated on ways to reduce the cost of the roadbed. The continuous concrete beam (2.4 meters deep and 3.5 meters wide) supporting the service structure runway at LC-34 cost more than $3,000 per meter - a prohibitive amount for LC-39’s proposed 19 kilometers of rail foundation. Griffith proposed, instead, concrete ties supported by rock ballast on vibro-compacted soil. In a 3 April report, George Walter criticized Griffith’s suggestion, arguing that the concrete ties and ballast would not stabilize the track horizontally. Walter opposed Griffith’s recommendation of curved tracks. In rounding a curve the transporter’s outside trucks would each follow a different route (the transporter would ride on four rails rather than two) and would require a complicated switching arrangement. Negotiating rail curves would also pose a serious problem in synchronizing the transporter’s drive units and maintaining a balanced load.²⁴

Presented with contradictory reports, LOD asked Connell & Associates to conduct a more detailed study. The findings of the Miami firm supported Walter’s position. Curved tracks were judged unacceptable because “the switches required would be fantastically complex . . . The matter of maintenance of track alignment of the curves is mother difficult aspect of this system to which an economical solution is not apparent."²⁵ The Connell engineers recommended a perpendicular set of railbeds for north-south and east-west travel with switching from one line to another accomplished by one of the Connell team’s own inventions: hydraulic equalizer jacks to raise the truck assemblies and a worm or pinion drive sector gear to rotate them. The Connell report questioned the feasibility of Griffith’s foundation. Ballast deflection would occur under the heavy horizontal wheel loads, causing track misalignment. Connell recommended a three-layer foundation: compacted fill, a soil-cement subbase, and a reinforced concrete pavement on top. Concrete ties would be keyed transversely to the reinforced pavement. The Connell proposal would reduce the expense of the foundation by over 50%, but even so LC-39’s roadbed figured to cost more than $28 million.²⁶

The Crawler Makes Its Debut

On Lincoln’s birthday, 1962, an LOD team visited Paradise, Kentucky, to watch a Bucyrus-Erie 2,700-metric-ton crawler-shovel in action. Albert Zeiler’s report compared the crawler favorably to LC-34’s service structure. The work platform, stabilized by hydraulic cylinders at the four corners, varied no more than one-half degree from level. Nearby, Bucyrus-Erie was constructing for the Peabody Coal Company a larger crawler-shovel which would have a load-bearing capacity in excess of the expected weight of the Saturn C-5 and its support equipment. Although minimum speed for the existing crawler was only 6.1 meters per minute, more speed could be built into the new model. Impressed with the crawler’s potential, the LOD representatives asked their hosts to propose a study program for LC-39.²⁷

Bucyrus-Erie began such a study one month later. An LOD phone call on 23 March requested preliminary information for Petrone’s congressional briefing that afternoon. Thomas Learmont, Bucyrus-Erie’s chief design engineer, provided tentative estimates: the crawler, jacks, hydraulic system, and steering mechanisms would cost $3,650,000, the umbilical tower $1,500,000, the box structure (launch platform) $800,000. The crawler figure reflected the cost of Bucyrus-Erie’s new model with few changes. Later Bucyrus-Erie incorporated a redundant power system and a more sensitive leveling mechanism, raising estimates an additional million dollars. Although the crawler’s reliability and flexibility were attractive the cost was a major disadvantage. LC-39 plans called for five launcher-transporters, putting the price of the crawler units at nearly $25 million. In early April, Buchanan suggested separating the launcher from its transporter and building only two crawlers. The proposal would increase total launcher-transporter weight (the separate crawler would require a heavy platform), but the cost savings more than compensated. After Buchanan’s idea won approval, LOD supplemented Bucyrus-Erie’s contract to include a “separate crawler” investigation.²⁸

By May the crawler was scoring the highest marks of the three transfer proposals. On the 10th Poppel, Buchanan, and Duren inspected barge tests at the model basin and reviewed the adverse findings from the wind tunnel. The following day Bucyrus-Erie’s final presentation was well received by NASA personnel. The crawler would go 1.6 kilometers per hour under load. Its turning radius was 152 meters. The hydraulic leveling system would keep the platform within 25 centimeters of the horizontal when moving on a 5% grade. The Jacksonville engineering firm of Reynolds, Smith, and Hills reported crawlerway costs per mile of $447,000 on high ground and $1,200,000 across marsh. The latter figure included the cost of removing 6 meters of silt so that a firm roadway could be constructed. The estimate was close to the eventual cost of $7.5 million for ten kilometers of crawlerway, On 15 May, Harvey Pierce summarized Connell’s rail study. Although the new railbed appeared sound, it was unproven and twice the cost of a crawlerway. Perhaps more important, the switching arrangements looked like trouble to operations personnel.²⁹

The crawler received a further boost from a 1 June Corps of Engineers report. During a three-week study, the Jacksonville office focused on Merritt Island’s ability to support the different transporters. Rail fared the worst.

As a result of the nonhomogeneity of the foundation materials, differential settlement is inevitable along any long embankment. The effect of such settlement would be most detrimental to any system using rails or concrete slabs. Flexible pavements would be less affected and the effect on canal design would be negligible.³⁰

A barge transporter would entail high construction costs for a launch basin and docking facilities at the vertical assembly building; the Corps of Engineers estimated $20,000,000 for the launch basin alone. The crawler presented no serious problems.

The decision to use the crawler came at an LC-39 conference on 12 - 13 June. Representatives from NASA Headquarters, the Manned Spacecraft Center, Marshall divisions, and private industry joined LOD at the Cape meeting. The launcher-transporter’s crucial role placed it first on the agenda. After reviewing LOD’s search, Donald Buchanan compared the three major contenders. Although the barge concept offered the best growth potential, there were unresolved design problems with propulsion, steering, platform stability, and placement at the Launch pad. Buchanan noted, “If meeting a tight schedule has any bearing on the choice of modes, it would be difficult to assign a low enough value to the barge to illustrate the situation as it now stands."³¹ The barge’s operational shortcomings included a vulnerability to blast and a slow reaction time (evacuating the rocket in an emergency from the launch pad). While both the rail and crawler systems were within the state of the art, the latter enjoyed advantages of cost and flexibility. Buchanan’s crawler recommendation met no serious objections.³²

Plans for a VAB

The complexity of LC-39 planning dictated formal program management. Debus moved to provide this in the summer of 1961 with the establishment of the Heavy Space Vehicle Systems Office. Rocco Petrone and two assistants constituted the primary working force at the outset. J. P. Claybourne, a Minnesota native and New York University graduate, had handled program management with Petrone in the Saturn Systems Office the previous year. William Clearman, raised in Georgia and educated at Georgia Tech, had served with naval aviation during and after World War II. By early 1962 Petrone’s office was providing other LOD offices with program criteria: details such as hook height, service platform levels, umbilical tower service arm heights, and weight loads for the transporter. This involved frequent liaison with MSFC, Houston’s Manned Spacecraft Center, and NASA Headquarters.³³

The vertical assembly building received much of the Heavy Vehicle Office’s attention. As Petrone noted in a March 1962 congressional briefing, “the building is our most expensive item. On this item we put forth greatest study.”³⁴ At the time Petrone estimated the VAB would cost $129.5 million of a total of $432 million for the entire complex. The earliest plans for the VAB envisioned a circular assembly building with a turntable to position the transporter. An alternate scheme resembled Martin Marietta’s Titan II assembly building design with high bays in line. LOD’s October 1961 study placed the high bays back-to-back with the transporter routed down the middle of the VAB. Martin’s C-3 study proposed a box-shaped VAB in which six high bays enclosed water channels - transportation by barge was still being considered. There were two unattractive features. An extensive canal system within the VAB would hamper operations and raise the humidity. Negotiating right angle turns into the high bays with the barge would require a floor plan of 204 × 303 meters, nearly 50% larger than the eventual VAB. LOD vetoed the design in January 1962.³⁵

At the LC-39 conference 6 February 1962, the Launch Facilities and Support Equipment Office agreed to compare open and enclosed VAB designs. Much of the subsequent study was performed by Brown Engineering Company of Huntsville. Ernest Briel directed 20 men investigating two VAB concepts with a barge transfer: one, a fully enclosed box structure with outward-opening bays; the second, an open, in-line structure with silo vehicle enclosures for the launch vehicle. R. P. Dodd supervised the Brown effort; James Reese performed liaison. Brown’s reports on 2 April rated the enclosed VAB good for operating characteristics but poor for expansion potential because of canals on three sides and a low bay on the fourth. With the in-line version, the canal would run along the front side, permitting expansion. Low cost was a second advantage; Brown engineers placed a $65 million price tag on the open VAB, $10 million less than the enclosed version. Since a major reason for the remote assembly building was protection from the weather, operations personnel opposed the open concept.³⁶

The operations group carried the day at the 13 June LC-39 conference. Gruene led the attack against the open design, arguing that environmental control would be a problem because of the umbilical openings; lightning would be a hazard in an open VAB, particularly if a rocket returned from the pad with ordnance aboard; with the silo enclosure open during assembly, high winds could curtail operations; and work at umbilical arm heights would be difficult. The conference agreed to a closed VAB, but no choice was made between an in-line and a box design.³⁷

While selection of the crawler simplified VAB planning, the design remained tentative the rest of the summer. At an 18 June meeting, Deese presented a design of six high bays in line and a low bay to the rear, the high bay areas to be constructed in three increments. The low bay, completely air conditioned, would provide checkout areas and aisle space for the upper stages and spacecraft. After erection of the first stage on a launcher-umbilical unit (accomplished by a 250-ton crane at the barge unloading dock), the crawler would carry it into a high bay through a 43 meter wide door and position the launcher on a set of concrete piers. Mating of the remaining stages would take place in the high bay where five retractable platforms provided access to the rocket. The launch control center and the central instrumentation facility would probably be housed within the VAB, using the roof as an antenna platform. Deese stated that an early definition of requirements was needed for both facilities.³⁸

VAB design was again discussed at a 31 July meeting convened by Petrone. Hook height for a 60-ton crane to mate the upper stages was set at 139 meters; the door would extend 3 meters higher. The first of four high bays would be ready for use in January 1965. The launch control center would go either on top of the low bay roof or between the transfer portals that opened to the high bays. Matters were still unsettled at a mid-August briefing for the center director. When LOC engineering presented a VAB plan with four enclosed high bays in line, Debus expressed reservations about the number of bays and the in-line design.³⁹

The architectural-engineering consortium URSAM won the contract for detailed VAB criteria in late August 1962 and quickly went to work. On the 30th, URSAM received a set of documents from the Cape that included: “An Evaluation of an Enclosed in Line Concept of a C-5 Vertical Assembly Building,” prepared by Brown Engineering Company; an evaluation of an open concept for the VAB, also prepared by Brown; NASA organizational charts and schedules; a general site plan of the Cape Canaveral missile test area; a “Geology and Soil Report” made by the Corps of Engineers the previous June; configurations of the C-5; plans of the retraction mechanism for the umbilical tower arms; general instructions; and discussions of the function of the VAB.⁴⁰

By September a Facilities Vertical Assembly Task Group consisting of Arthur J. Carraway, Jack Bing, and Norman Gerstenzang of NASA, and Wesley Allen and Ernest M. Briel of Brown Engineering, was busy defining requirements for URSAM - the general layout of the VAB, the needed shops, general support engineering, and work areas. Some 600 people were expected to work in the VAB, including 100 Pan American maintenance people. A variety of things had to be resolved, from the requirements for a cafeteria to the umbilical arms in the low bays. On 6 September the group worked out methods of obtaining critical and emergency power; the cable requirements from the pad to the VAB, from the launch control center to each high bay, and within each high bay ; the power requirements for the launcher umbilical tower; and the launch control center layout.⁴¹

Four days later an URSAM team arrived at the Cape and, in its first meeting, reached a major decision. It proposed that NASA place the bays in the VAB back-to-back rather than in-line, to gain the following advantages:

• Availability of all four high bays for vehicle erection and assembly without any restrictions.
• Reduction in the number of cranes required from seven to three.
• Elimination of extensive handling of the upper stages on railmounted dollies, thus avoiding complex turntable installations and differential settlement problems.
• Simplification of booster and upper-stage transfer and erection procedures.
• Greater adaptability for expansion.⁴²

Another consideration, the paramount one for many LOD engineers, was the wind load factor. The huge assembly building would be subjected to tremendous wind pressures and a back-to-back design promised more stability.⁴³

The Mobile Launch Concept - Debate and Approval

Debus had little trouble with critics of the mobile concept within LOD. it was a different story outside the launch team. At NASA Headquarters, Milton Rosen questioned both cost and feasibility. In early January 1962, he commissioned a launch facility study by three engineers of the Office of Manned Space Flight. Drawing their information from NASA and aerospace corporation studies, the team concluded that fixed pads were preferable to the mobile concept. The judgment rested on three grounds: the automated checkout equipment and increased reliability of space vehicles would reduce the minimum interval between launches from a fixed pad to one month; the high launch rates, for which the mobile concept was designed, were increasingly unlikely; and the mobile launch concept involved too many risks and engineering uncertainties.⁴⁴

The mobile concept came under more fire in March. On the 6th von Braun notified Debus that an adverse Air Force report had triggered further doubts at NASA Headquarters. Debus stuck to his guns and was supported by Seamans and Holmes. During congressional testimony in early April, Holmes responded to an inquiry regarding the VAB’s importance:

This is an absolute necessity. It is a basic element in our lunar program. If we don’t go to this type of vertical assembly, protected from weather, where assembly can take place with integrated checkout equipment for our lunar program, I really think we will end up with the same kind of rather crude facilities we now have for launching, where we assemble them on the pad for 2 or 3 months, where we do not have spares, and it would probably be impossible to use Earth orbital rendezvous.⁴⁵

LOD’s opportunity to defend LC-39 came on 23 March when Representative Olin Teague’s Manned Space Flight Subcommittee visited the Cape. After describing the mobile concept’s advantages in general terms of flexibility and high launch potential, Debus listed seven specific advantages:

• Pad staytime reduced to a week.
• A minimum of equipment exposed to launch area hazards.
• Repetitious testing eliminated by automation.
• Pad unaffected by different vehicle stage arrangements since the transporter-launcher carried the checkout equipment.
• Considerable savings in land costs.
• Minimum construction costs for high launch rates.
• Economic utilization of personnel.

Petrone stressed the last two points. LC-37’s $432-million price tag was a bargain compared with the $900-million cost of nine fixed pads for 36 annual launches. If LOD planned facilities for a maximum launch rate of 24 per year, LC-39 still represented a saving of $168 minion. One congressman considered Petrone’s manpower savings estimates the best argument For LC-39. The complex would employ 2,200 men, 1,500 fewer than the requirement for nine fixed pads. The annual savings in salaries would amount to $18 million; comparing LC-39 to six fixed pads, Petrone estimated savings of $8 million per year.⁴⁶

The committee questioned the VAB’s availability for Nova. Petrone pointed out that Nova dimensions were not firm and postponing LC-39 plans would delay the Saturn C-5 program. The VAB design would allow modification at a later date. Col. Clarence Bidgood, Facilities Chief, stated that flexibility was desirable at three points in the complex: the assembly building, the transporter, and the launch pad. Although LOD was attempting to provide growth potential and a capability for handing solids or liquids, “you might build so much expense into it to get flexibility that it would be very, very uneconomical in the first place.” The congressmen were silent on two important matters affecting LC-39: the likelihood of high launch rates and the technical problems of the mobile concept. Perhaps they were unaware of the engineering difficulties that bothered Harvey Pierce and Milton Rosen. They may have feared delay in a pacing item^* of the Apollo program. As Teague said, the committee was well disposed toward LOD’s project. Their main concern was defending LC-39 before the House Appropriations Committee.⁴⁷

By late May planning on LC-39 was well along; preliminary schedules called for design criteria contracts within three months. Debus moved to secure approval of the mobile concept at the Office of Manned Space Flight Management Council meeting on 29 May 1962. He acknowledged that launch rates were at a break-even point and cost savings no longer a major factor. LC-39, however, offered distinct technical advantages. Milton Rosen accepted Debus’s arguments, but thought there should be further study of the disadvantages. Robert Gilruth expressed MSC’s concern that LC-39 would not provide servicing of the spacecraft at the pad. Von Braun then interjected a telling point. The fundamental question, the Huntsville director stated, was whether they believed “a space program is here to stay, and will continue to grow.” The Council responded with approval of Debus’s plan.⁴⁸

Despite the vote of confidence, the issue reappeared at the 22 June Management Council meeting. Rosen warned that LC-39 would be three years in the making and any slippage would delay the launch program. He recommended modifying the complex to allow for on-pad assembly. As a compromise Debus suggested transporting the arming tower to the pad for assembly purposes or spacecraft checkout.^** Although Holmes requested more information pending a final decision, the mobile concept was a virtual certainty. Rosen had told Debus on the 15th not to worry about further questioning; Headquarters was going along with LC-39.⁴⁹

June 1962 brought other Apollo decisions, including selection of lunar-orbital rendezvous (LOR) for the mission mode. NASA had studied the issue since the late 1960s. At first, either direct flight with a Nova or earth-orbital rendezvous (EOR) with Saturns seemed likely choices; but by May 1962, debate had narrowed to EOR versus LOR. Lunar-orbital enthusiasts at Langley, Houston, and Headquarters stressed the advantage of landing on the moon with a light vehicle specially designed for the mission. MSFC engineers continued to support EOR for practical as well as technical reasons: much of their workload would disappear if EOR was dropped. An impasse seemed likely, until von Braun announced his support for the lunar-orbital mode on 7 June. The decision was brought on by the influence of LOR’s technical advantages, assurances that Headquarters would compensate MSFC with new tasks, and concern for the Apollo program. In explaining the about-face to his Huntsville team, von Braun stated: “If we do not make a clear-cut decision on the mode very soon, our chances of accomplishing the first lunar expedition in this decade will fade rapidly.”⁵⁰ With Houston and Huntsville in agreement, the matter was pretty well settled. The Management Council and Administrator Webb approved LOR within a month. At its 22 June meeting the Management Council also endorsed immediate development of a lunar excursion module and an intermediate rocket, the Saturn IB. The new member of the Saturn family would use an uprated S-I stage (first stage of the Saturn C-1) and the new S-IVB stage for testing the Apollo spacecraft in earth orbit.⁵¹

The summer’s weekly staff reports to Debus reveal the breadth of LC-39 activities. On 5 July Karl Sendler reported on the telemetry studies of the Manned Lunar Landing Program (MLLP) Instrumentation Planning Group. Two weeks later the group organized an eight-man task force to determine LC-39’s requirements for weather data. The continuing dispute over LC-39 siting was a frequent topic of Colonel Bidgood’s Facilities Office reports. On 5 July Bidgood notified Debus that a site proposal was ready for the MLLP Joint Facilities Planning Group; it called for placing the complex near the ocean. Although the Air Force no longer insisted that NASA place LC-39 north along the Mosquito Lagoon, it wanted the complex 4.5 kilometers inland. Air Force officials believed that location would provide space for additional launch complexes at a later date. The matter dragged on for six more weeks before the Air Force Missile Test Center yielded. Bidgood reported two major achievements on 23 August: Air Force concurrence on siting and initiation of criteria work for LC-39.⁵²

The Launch Support Equipment Office began a study of the mobile arming tower in June, following Debus’s offer to investigate the matter for the Management Council. Poppet announced the study’s completion in his 16 August report: “it is not only feasible but highly recommended since this added flexibility to the C-5 complex can be achieved with little increase in cost.” The flexibility concerned the use of the mobile arming tower to erect upper stages at the pad if necessary. The study rejected using the 116-meter tower to erect the booster, since the addition of a huge crane would impose severe structural problems.⁵³

LC-39 was the sole topic at a meeting of the Launch Operations Working Group on 18-19 July that brought together 113 representatives from LOD, MSFC, and the launch vehicle contractors: Boeing, North American, Douglas, and General Electric. In Petrone’s absence, Phillip Claybourne and William Clearman chaired the sessions. Claybourne’s welcoming remarks described the role of the working group panels, teams that were to be organized later in the day to exchange information and accomplish specific tasks. Clearman followed with a general description of LC-39.

Following Donald Buchanan’s report on the crawler and launcher-umbilical tower, Chester Wasileski briefed the meeting on propellant systems. Although LC-39 would involve no new propellants, loading requirements would dwarf LC-34 operations. Each pad would need storage for approximately 3,407,000 liters of LOX, 946,000 liters of RP-1, 2,460,000 liters of LH₂, and 946,000 liters of LN2. Propellant loading rates would be:

LOD planned to automate propellant loading on all Saturn launch sites; controls in the Launch control center would operate through the data link on the launcher. A compression-converter facility near the VAB would provide gases to charge high-pressure spheres on the launch vehicle and to keep certain ground support equipment free of moisture and dust. Wasileski proposed redundant sensors in the loading system and asked the panels for further comment.

Robert Moore and Bradley Downs of the Firing-Equipment Design Group (Launch Support Equipment Office) described the seven arms of the launcher-umbilical tower that would provide personnel access and support electrical cables, propellant lines, and pneumatic lines to the launch vehicle. Prior to the rocket’s first motion, five arms would disconnect and begin withdrawal. Arms 4 and 6, providing hydrogen vent ducting and services to the S-II stage and the instrumentation unit, would retract at liftoff. Moore asked the groups responsible for individual stage operations to reexamine their service needs. Lengthy but inconclusive debate followed on a remote reconnect capability for aborted missions.⁵⁴

With this meeting, LC-39 was just about ready to go. After it won final approval, Marvin Redfield, co-author of the NASA Headquarters report that had criticized the mobile concept, congratulated his friend, Rocco Petrone, but insisted the price would far exceed the launch team’s estimates. Petrone accepted the challenge, wagering a case of Scotch that costs would not run over $500 million. The bill eventually came to about $500 million despite a significant reduction in LC-39 components, e.g., four high bays instead of six in the VAB. When Petrone insisted he had won the bet, Redfield grudgingly agreed to pay, but only one bottle at a time. On the occasion of the first payment, Petrone, either doubting the fairness of his victory or influenced by the good cheer, absolved Redfield of further payments.⁵⁵

The General Accounting Office was less jovial about the $500 million price tag. A report in 1967 would imply that LC-39 had been a costly mistake, a conclusion that NASA would strenuously oppose.